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This  paper  provides  a  theoretically  consistent  approach  to  estimating
demand relationships  in which kink points occur either in  the interior
or  on  the  vertices  of  the  budget  set.  There  are  important  classes  of
problems in  developing countries which demonstrate  such kinked budget
sets  including binding non-negativity constraints.  This paper also
extends these methods  to  the  estimation of production structures.  As  an
application  a translog cost  function  for three energy  inputs is  estimated
from  cross-sections  of  individual  Indonesian  firms.Microeconometric Models of  Rationing, Imperfect  Markets,
and  Non-negativity  Constraints
Lung-oi  ,oe ;and  Marlk  M.  Pitt
I.  I it  roduct  iLon
Micro-data  sets  have  become  inc(reasingly  iml)ortlant  in  applied work
in  development economics.  This new importance  reflects both the changing
orientation  of  development  economics  and  the  nature  of  the  data  available
in  developing  countries.  It  has  become  increasingly  recognized  that
formulating  development  policy  requires  information  that  can  only  be
acquired  by  modeling  and  estimating  the  behaviors  of  individual  economic
agents.  Areas of  research  that  fall under the heading of "the new house-
hold economics,"  such  as  the  fertility, schooling and health behaviors
of households,  almost  always  require  micro-data  from  household  surveys
to  estimate the  relationships  of  interest.  Micro-data has  also  been
invaluable  in  estimating  the  behavior  of  farmers  (and  firms)  who  can  choose
among discrete technologies  (such as high-yielding seed  technologies) but
who  face  a variety of market  failures.  The  class  of  models known as
"agricultural  household  models"  - typically  estimated  with  micro-data  - have
been  critical  in  understanding  the  complex  behaviors  governing  households
which are  both  producers  and consumers.
Even in  those  areas of empirical  investigation in which  time-series
data are  typically relied upon,  the absence of sufficiently long time series
in the  developing  countries has necessitated other empirical approaches.
For example, there  is  a large literature which estimates the  industrial
demand  for energy  in the  developed countries.  Almost  all of these esti-
mates make  use of either a single time  series or time  series data pooled
by  subsector or state/country, [Pindyck,  10791.  The absence  of similardata sets  for  developed  countries  has  precluded  the  same  type  of  analysis
of  their production  structures.  This  is  unfortunate  since  energy  policy
issues  in  the  developing  countries  are  as  important  as  in  the  industrialized
countries.  Furthermore,  most  of  the  existing  econometric
estimates  may be inapplicable to  LDCs since  it  is  likely that  their
structure  of  production  is  significantly  different.
Cross-section  data  can  be  used  to  surmount  the  time  series constraint
in  many  instances,  but  only  by  exploiting  a  characteristic  of  cross-
section  data  peculiar  to  LDCs.  That  peculiarity  is  the  substantial  spatial
variation  in  prices  found  in  single  cross-sections,  resulting  from  poor
transportation  and  distributional  infrastructure.  This  cross-sectional
price  variation  has  been  used  to  estimate  price elasticities  for house-
holds  in  large  developing  countries  where  spatial  price  variability  is
well known - such  as  island  Indonesia,  Timmer  (1981)  and  Lee  and  Pitt
(1987),  for  example  - but  also  in  small  countries  such  as  Sierra  Leone
[Strauss  (1982)  and  (1986)],  the  Dominican  Republic,  [Yen  and  Roe  (1986]  and  the
Ivory  Coast,  (Deaton  (1 9 8 6)).In  this  paper,  we  make  use  of  spatial  cross-
section price variation  to estimate  a cost  function  for energy inputs
used  in  manufacturing  in  a  developing  country  (Indonesia).  This  is  the
first attempt we know of  to estimate a manufacturing cost  function  from
a single price-varying cross-section.
One  of  the  great  impediments  to  using  cross-section  data  from  develop-
ing countries  in  econometric  research has been the lack of an unrestrictive
and theoretically  consistent approach  to  dealing with a  common attribute
of these data,  kink points  in the budget sets of consumers or iso-costs
sets of  firms.  These kink points arise quite  frequently  from binding non-
negativity constraints on  inputs  or  outputs  in  a  multiple  input/multiple
,tlpuLt  production  technology or from binding non-negativity constraintson  the  dlemands  of  consuime  rs.  Ioring kink  points  in the  data will  result
in  biased estimates.  For  the  case of  corner solutions  in demand  system
estimation, the  application  of standard systems estimators or Tobit  esti-
mation will, for  systems with more  than  two  goods, result  in biased estimates
since  they  fail  to  consider that  consumers  response  to price  depends  on the
set  of  goods  it  consumes at  corners.  Furthermore,  excluding from the  sample
those observations  in which kink  points are  observed is  likely to  result
in  sample selection bias.  Recent papers  by  Wales  and  Woodland  (1983)  and
Lee  and Pitt  (1986) have proposed methods  for dealing with
the  estimation of  consumer-demand systems with binding non-negativity
constraints.  Wales and  Woodland's  approach is  based upon the Kuhn-Tucker
condlitions associated wtih a stochastic  direct  utility  function.  Lee  and Pitt,
taking the  dual  approach, begin with  indirect  utility  function and show
how virtual price relationships  can  take  the  place of Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
As  of yet,  these  approaches have not been extended to  two areas of
importance  to  applied development  economics - binding non-negativity
constraints on the inputs  and outputs of  firms/farms, and kink points
that  exist  in  the  interior  (as opposed to  the  vertices)  of  budget or
iso-cost  sets.  The  significance of  the  extension  to  firms/farms  is
implied by  the  importance of agricultural household models in  development
literature  and policy  formulation, and by the  lack of long time  series
on  the behaviors of  firms/farms.  In  this paper, we extend the earlier
work of Wales  and Woodland and ourselves on estimating consumer demands
with binding non-negativity constraints  to  the problems  of estimating the
production structure of firms and  farms.  As an application of our methods,
we estimate  a translog energy  cost  function  for  two Indonesian manufacturing
suiscertors with  a sample of  firms many of whom do not consume one or more  fuels.Generalizing  our  methods  to  the  problem  of  estimating  demand  relation-
ships  in which kink points occur in  the interior of budget or iso-cost
sets  is  one  which  is  particularly  important  in  the  developing  countries.
The  prevalence of  such  kink points  in developing countries  is  simply a
reflection of  the continued popularity of market interventions which
create  "dual" markets  for  goods and outputs.  LDC consumers commonly
face  dual  markets  as  a  result  of  food  rationing  systems  or  "fair  price"
shops which offer them articles at  subsidized prices but  in  limited
quantities.  Consumption in excess of  these quantities must be purchased
in  the  free  (unsubsidized) market.  Such systems exist or have existed
in  almost  all  of  the  large  developing  countries  - India,  China,  Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Egypt and Indonesia - and in  dozens of  smaller ones.  Food
stamp  systems  such  as  found  in  Sri  Lanka,  Trinidad  and  Tobago  and  Colombia
put  kinks  in  consumers  budget  sets  in  very  much  the  same  manner.  Existing
econometric work involving dual  markets is  limited and not  altogether satis-
factory, partly due  to  the  lack of econometric methods  consistent with such
kink points.
Kinks  occur in  the producers  optimization problem in  a large variety
of  instances  as  well.  Import  licensing  and  quotas  and  the  rationing  of
intermediate  inputs  (including  fuels  and  electricity),  and  the  resulting
illegal  (black)  markets  in  rationed  goods,  are  still  widespread  in  the
developing  world.  In  many  LDCs  agricultural  input,  output  and  credit
markets  are  often  targets  of  government  intervention  that  results  in  dual
markets.  In  Brazil, quotas on the  sale of sugar cane  extend down  to  the
level of individual  cultivators.  The forced sales of agricultural outputs
to the state at below free  market prices have  at  one time or another been
features of  India,  Indonesia and many African nations.  Modern inputs,such  as  fertilizer,  have  often  been  offered  at  "subsidized"  prices  but  in
limited  amount  to  cultivators  who  must  enter  the  free  market  for  additional
input  beyond  their  ration.
In  this  article,  we  present  a  theoretically  con-
sistent  approach  to  dealing with  kink  points  facing  both  consumers  and
producers.  This  paper  extends  our  earlier  work  on  binding  non-negativity
constraints  in  the  consumer'sproblem  to  the  study  of  convex  budget  sets
and  to  the  estimation  of  production  technologies  and  behaviors.  As  an
application  of  our  methods,  we  estimate  a  translog  cost  function  for
energy  inputs  using  firm-level  data  from  the  Indonesian  weaving  and  metal
products  sectors.  The  methods  developed  are  applicable  to  a  wide  range
of  issues  in  applied  development  economics  and  to  the  cross-section  micro-
data  most  offen  available  in  LDCs  and  used  in  research  in  applied  economic
development.  The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.
-In Section  2  we  consider  the  consumers  problem  when  fI  iced  with  a
convex  bu•dget  set  . Ir  S 2ection  3  we  derive  econometric  specifications  of
consumer  demand  systems  derived  from  stochastic  formulations  of  the  primal
(direct  utility  function)  problem  and  dual  (indirect  utility  function)
problem  respectively.  Section  4  extends  our  kink  point  analysis  to  the  case
of  production  economics.  As  an  application  of  those  methods,  a  transloy
energy  cost  function  for  Indonesia  is  estimated  and  discussed  in  Section  5.
Section  6  summarizes  our  results.6
2.  Convex  Budget  Sets  in  Consumer  Demand
Convex  budget  sets  result  naturally  from binding  non-negativity
constraints  but  also  from  quantity  rationing  and  increasing  block  pricing.
All  of  these  sources  of  convexity  can  be  analyzed  within  a  common  framework.
A simple  three  goods  case  with  increasing  block  prices  for  the  commodity  x.
is  illustrated  in  Figure  1.  The  marginal  unit  price  for  quantities  of
x1  less  than  or  equal  to  x1 (1) is  P1,'  and  p1 2  (with  p1 2  >  P11 ) for
quantities  greater  than  xl(1).  With  income  M,  the  budget  plane  ABDE  is
determined  by  Pl1xI +  P2X2  +  P3X3   M and  the  budget  plane  BCD  is  based  on
P2X  +  P 2X 2  +  3X3  =  M +  (P 12  - 1 1 )x(1).  The  point  x1 (1) is  a  kink
point  for  good  1  and  so  are  the  non-negativity  constraints.  Quantity  ration-
ing  with  upper  ration  limit  xl(1)  can  be  regarded  as  the  special  case  of
S12 P12  =  "
Figure  1
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IIn  the  general  multicommodity  case,  every  commodity  may  be  subject  to
increasing  block  pricing.  For  commodity  j,  assume  there  are  I.  (T  >  1)
di  (  ien  ti 1 lock  pri'es  p  2.I  - ...  - .i  orre;ponl  i  i  h to  h  I  Ink  po  l  ill;
. A  i  1 x.(1),...,x.(T.  - 1)  where  x.(l)  <  x.(i  +  1)  for  1=1,...,1.  - 2.  The
case  I.  =  1 is  the  standard  single  price  situation.  If  x.(I.  - 1) is
the  quantity  upper  limit  for  commodity  j,  P  =  for  quantity  rationing.
For  notational simplicity, we  adopt  the conventions  x.(O)  =  0  and  x.(i ,)
Let  UI(x,  ....  L)  be  a  utility  function  which  is  continuously  differ-
entiable,  increasing  and  strictly  quasi-concave.  The  utility  maximization
problem  is
max  U(x ,...,x  )
m
S)  ..  . <  M,
j  . :l 1 i  < . .1  - J  --
0  < x..  < x.(i)  - x.(i-1)  - x.(i)  iCK.,  j=l,...,m  (1)
- J  '  1  J.1-i
x.  =-  )  x..
:  iCK.
where  K.  =  {0,1,...,I.}  is  the  set  of  integers  describing  the  kink  points
for  product  j  and  x..  is defined as  the  purchase  of  product  j  in  block  i.
For  econometric analysis  it  is  necessary to  determine  the conditions under
which an optimal solution would occur at  each demand regime,  given
the values of  the explanatory variables.  For two  goods cases,  these con-
ditions  are  readily obtained diagrammatically.  Burtless  and Hausman  (1978)
and  Hlausman  (1979)  have characterized the  optimal solution based on the
location  of  indifference  curves  for  the  two  goods  case.  Nore  recently,8
Hausman  and  Ruud  (1984)  describe  the  case  of  a three  goods  model  of  family
labor supply.  However, as  we will demonstrate below, optimality can be
simply characterized by Kulhn-Tucker  conditions or with virtual prices, even
for  the  general  problem  of  (1).  This  analysis  generalizes  the  approach  in
Wales  and Woodland  (1983) and Lee  and  Pitt  (1986)  for  non-negativitv  con-
straints  with either the direct  utility or dual approaches to  the  convex case.
The  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  for  the  problem  (1)  are
BL  aU(x) S  U(x)  - -Pi..  - ..  <  0  <  x..,
11  - - 1  (2)
- .-x =  • 9x..  ji  j
11
]  i
DL -T  MT-  ..  p..  x..  >0  ,
DPXJ  1  1  .ji  j3, 
> )<
0  =  0,
DL
DL  -
3--  x.(i)  - x..  > 0  <  (4)
Ji  J  j-4
S  =  0
Aji.  ji
Ji
where  L  is  the  Lagrange  function  and  H and  X's  are  Lagrange  multipliers.
Because  of the block pricing system where 0 < pjl < j2 <  ..., purchases
will  always  be  made  in  lower  price  blocks  before  higher  price  blocks.  Hence,
if  x..  > 0, x.  =  x.(e) for  all £  <  i, and that  if  x..  =  0,  x.  =  0  for
all  £  > i.  Thus  the demand for good j  is
i.
x.  =  E   . x
where i.  is  the  highest integer  for which x..  > 0.
Let x* be  a demanded quantity vector such  thatx.  =  0,  jEJ 1
x.  =  x.(i.),  jCJ 2   (5)
x.(i.-1)  <  x.  < x.(i.),  jJ 3
for  some  i  ,  jE J2UJ3  where  J  2  J  and  J3  are  some  partition  of  the
set  {1,2,..,m}.
Define  the  virtual  prices  at  x*  as
%  U(x*.) c.(x*)  x*)/.  (6)
where  p  >  0  follows  from  assumed  strictly  increasing  property  of  the
utility  function.  It  follows  from  the  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  (2)  - (4)  that
(.X) <pj  -jGJ
i  <  .(x*)  <  P.  EJ2  (7)
J i-  ]  - _ji.+ 1  2
1  1
(x*)=  p.  jJ  . iji.  3
The  price  E.(x*)  is  known  as  the  virtual  price  for  good  j  at  the  quentity  x*,
or  also  as  its  shadow  price  [Rothbarth  (1941)].  The  kink  point  x.(i.),  is  the  quan-
tity  demanded  for  good  j,  jGJ 2  because  the  block  price  p..  for  good  j  is  less  than
r.(x*)  and  therefore  the  consumer  buys  as  much  of  the  good  as  permitted
underp..  ,but  the  second  block  price  p..  is  sufficiently  high  so  that  the
consumer  does  not  wish  to  purchase  any  more.  If  x.(i.)  is  purely  an  upper
limit  ratlioned  amount,  optimality  at  the  rationed  limit  will  be  charac-
terized  by
p..<  (x)
i  i.  - j
since  p  i  =  c  for  thle  rationed  case.  The  goods  x.,  j CEJ  are  purchased  at  tlhe 1  ]1
quantitrits  x.  suchl  that  their  virtual  prices  equal  market  prices.
h'le  use  of  the  concept  ol  virutal  prices  is  well  known  in  the  quantity10
rationing  literature,  e.g.,  Rothbarth  (1941),  Neary  and  Roberts  (1980)
and  Deaton  (1981)  and  in  the  nonlinear  tax  studies,  Burtless  and  Hausmann
(1978).
3.  Econometric  Model  Specification
In  their  treatment  of  binding  non-negativity  constraints,  Wales  and
Woodland  (1983)  have  considered  the  specification  of  a  direct  random  utility
function  and  derive  its likelihood  function  through  the  Kuhn-Tucker
conditions.  Lee  and  Pitt  (1986)  have  pointed  out  that  the  dual  approach,
which  specifies  an  indirect  utility  function  or  a  system  of  demand  equa-
tions,  is  also  feasible,  because  the  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  can  be  repre-
sented  by virtual  prices.
For  the  general  convex  budget  problem  (1),  the  likelihood  function  can
be  derived  with  the  aid  of  the  virtual  price  characterization  in  (7).
Suppose  that  D.(p,M;  E)  i=l,  ... ,  m  are  the  specified  stochastic
1
(notional)  demand  functions,  which  are  solutions  to  the  utility  maxi-
mization  problem  max  {U(x)  p'x  =  M}.  The  stochastic  utility  function
U(x)  corresponds  to  the  utility  function  in  our  problem  in  (1).  Consider
the  demand  vector  x*  in  (5)  where  J  ={1,2,...,£  -1}, J2={£  ,...,£-1}  and  J  =
{I2,92+1,...,m}.  The  virtual  prices  and  the  virtual  income  c  which  support  x*
are  characterized  by  the  inequalities  (7)  and  the  demand  relations
0  =  Dj.(1  "'  '  2- , 
'  ,  P2  . '  "*'  Pmi  ,  c;  E)  j=l,  ... ,  .1-1  (8)
x  (i)  =  D  ( 1   2-1'  .2  P'mi  ,  c;  E)
J-.'  "  .,  2-1  (9)
x.  =  D.(F  .,  P
j  =  D  1'  £2-1'  £2 i2  ,  ..  Pmi  ,  c;  e)  j=Z2',  2+1,  ... ,  m  (10)
2  m
where  c  =  M +  m   j-1(pj  +-p)  x.(£)  +  jI2- 1  (Sj-Pjij)  x(i.).  These
j=equations  provide  an  implicit  function  from  the  disturbance  vector  e  to  the
equations provide an  implicit  function  from the disturbance vector E  to the
*  *  *
vector  (  1  ... ,  1 ,  x  ,  x  ,+1'  ... ,  x  _l)  Since  the  demand  vector  x*
2  k  2  P  2  m-1
lies  on  a  budget  plane  the  equation  x  is  functionally  dependent  on
m11
the  other  equations  and  is  redunidant.  Given  a  joint  density  function  for
the  equations  (8)  - (10)  imply  a  joint  density  function  for  (,  ... ,
, 2  x2,  x  ,  ... ,  x  ) . Let  g('  ,  ....  2,  x  ,  x 92  ... ,  x-1) ^2  ]   x2  2+1  m  '  2-  ,  x  ,.  x
denote  the  implied  joint  density  function.  It  follows  that  the  likelihood
function  for  this  observation  is
p  9  -1
£2 -1  j(i  +l)  1  'i -
*  * (  f  f  J  )(  H  /  )  f  g('  P,  -x  - ,  ... ,  xm-)
j=£  p.i.  j=l  0  2  -'2 
m
d I ...- dS£ 2-  . (11)
where  (I  f  )  denotes  multiple  integrals.
There  may  be  various  ways  to  introduce  the  disturbances  E  into  a
demand  system.  A possible  strategy  is  to  assume  that  some  parameters
are  stochastic,  e.g.  Burtless  and  Hausman  (1978).  Additive  disturbances
may  not  necessarily  be  compatible  with  random utility  maximization.  Given
a  functional  form  for  the  notional  demand  equations,  enough  disturbance
components  need  to  be  introduced  such  that  any  possible  observed  demand
vector  x*  can  be  realized  by  some  values  of  c;  i.e.,  (8)  - (10)  have  solutions
for  c.  It  is  also  desirable  to  introduce  enough  disturbance  components
such  that  the  density  functions  g  do  not  degenerateon  lower  dimensional
spaces.  Depending  on  the  specified  functional  forms  and  the  disturbances,
the  likelihood  function  (11)  may  involve  multiple  integral;.
The  evalu.ation  ol  !.  likelihood  function  may  be  cumbersome  and  expensive
for  integrals  of  Imor  than  two  dimensions.  In  Lee  and  Pitt  (1986),  we
have  investigated  some  stochastic  specifications  which  may  result  in  com-
,it  a;lti  n(llI  Iv  tractabll  ,  i1  k  lli  od  funcl lons.
'he  basic  feature  of  thi  mnode-i  is  that  it  assigns  a  positive  proba-
bility  to  observing  consumption  at  a  kink.  The  model  is  thus  well  suited
to  the  case  of  non-negativity  constraints  where  zero  consumption  is  fre-
quently  observed  in  micro-data.  In  the  case  of  block  pricing,  observed  data
may  not  reveal  accumulations  of  observations  at  the  boundaries  of  price  blocks.
This  would  suggest  that  another  disturbance,  such  as  a  measurement  error,12
needs  to  be  included  in  the  model.  This  additional  disturbance  will  further
complicate  the  likelihood function.  This  issue  is addressed by Burtless and
llausman  (1978)  and  H1usman  (1985)  for  the  two  goods  case.
4.  ProducL  ion  iAna  1  v\s
Our analysis, which has until  now focused on consumer  demand models,
can be extended  to  the analysis  of production technologies.  Kink points
may occur because of binding non-negativity  constraints  on  inputs or
outputs in  a multiple input or multiple output  technology.  Production
quotas or the quantity rationing of inputs will also create kink points.
Increasing block prices in inputs  or decreasing block pricing of outputs
are similar to  quantity rationing.
Consider the profit maximization problem subject to  quantities constraints:
max  p'q  - r'x
x,q
subject  to  F(q,x)  =  0,  q  >  q  O,  x  >  x  >  0
(12)
where x and q are k x 1 and m x 1 vectors of inputs and outputs respectively,
and x and q are the upper quantity limits.  The production function F is  an
increasing  function of  q's  and a decreasing function of  x's.  Other standard
regularity conditions  on F such as  differentiability and strict quasi-concavity
are assumed.  To illustrate  the  construction of virtual prices  from the pro-
*
duction  technology  F,  let  us  consider  a  simple  regime  with  x* =  (0,  x2, ...
xk)'  and q* =  (ql'  q2'  ...  qm)'  where  the  first  input  is  not  utilized
and the  first output  is produced at  the quota level.  The Lagrangean
function is
L =  p'q - r'x  +  X(O - F(q,x))  +  q'q +  p'x  +  6'(q  - q) + w'(x - x)
where  6,  i,  6, amd w are vectors of Lagrangean  multipliers.  The  optimality
of  this x* is characterized by the  following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:13
- F(q*,  x*)  +  >
-r  A  '  +  9  - 0,  4  >  0;
1
. F(q*,  x*) -r.  - F  =  0,  i=2,  ... ,  k; i  Dx.
S F(q*,  x*) p6  --  0, 6  >  0; P  ql  1=
aF(q*,  x*)
p  - F(q*x*  0,  j=2,  ... ,  m
F(q*,  x*)  =  0,  q*  >  0,  x*  >  0.  (13)
Define  the  virtual  price  dl  for  input  1  and  virtual  price  sl  for  output
1  at  x*  as
S  3F(q*,  x*)
ýdl  x  -
and
S  F(q*,  x*)
sl  9ql
DF(q*,  x-)  F(q,  x*) Since  ,  x*)  <  0  and  q*  )  >  0,  Sdl  and  sl  are  strictly  positive.
1  1
It  follows  that  =  rl  - dl  and  6=  p-  s.  Therefore  this  regime  is
characterized  by
r  >  dl'  0  <  x.  <  x.,  i=2,  ... ,  k 1  dl'
and  p  >  s'  0  <  qj  <  qj,  j=2,  ... ,  m. 1=- s1  j  j
Input  1  is  not  used  because  the  market  price  for  this  input  is  too  high
and  output  1  is  produced  up  to  the  quota  limit  because  the  market  price
for  this  output  is  high  enough.  This  technique  can  be  similarly  applied
to  other  regimes.
The  case  of  increasing  block  prices  in  inputs  can  be  reformulated
into  the  framework  (12).  Consider  the  simple  case  of  a  single  input  x
with  production  function  q  =  f(x).  Assume  the  price  of  input  x  is  r14
if  the  purchased  amount  is  less  than  x1 (1) but  a  higher  price  r 2  for
amounts  in  excess  of  xl(1).  Hence  the  cost  c(x)  is
c(x)  =  r  x,  if  x  <  X  (1);
=  rlx 1 (1)  +  r 2 (x  - x1 (1)),  if  x  >  x 1 (l).
The  problem  max  {pq  - c(x)  I  F(q,x)  =  0,  x  >  0}  can  be  rewritten  into  an
x
identical  problem  with  two  perfectly  substitutable  inputs:
max  pq  - rlx  - r2x 2
xl,x2
subject  to  q  =  f(x 1  +  x2 ),  0  xl I  (X(1),  x2  >  0
As  the  price  of  xl  is  less  than  x2 ,  xl will  always  be  purchased  first.
x2  will  be  purchased  only  if  xl  has  been  purchased  up  to  its  upper  limit
xl(1).  x l()  is  a  kink  point  in  this  model.  If  the  observed  sample  is
(q*,  x*)  =  (q*,  x1 (1)).  The  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  for  (q*,  x1 (1))  will  be
af(xl(1))
-r1  +  X -ax  - w  = 0,  w  >O
9f(x  (1))
-r2  +   x  +  2  =  0,  2  > O,
p-  =  0
q*  =  f(x 1 (l))
Hence  the  optimality  of  this  (q*,  xl(1))  is  characterized  by
r  >  d(X*)  r
af(x*)
where  Ed(x*)  =  p  -x  is  the  virtual  price  of  input  x  at  x 1 (1).  If
the  sample  observation  (q*,  x*)  is  x*  >  x  (1),  then  it  will be  characterized
by  %d(x*) =  r2.15
Similarly,  the  decreasing  block  prices  in  outputs  can  also  be  for-
mulated  in  the  framework  (12).  Consider  a  single  output  case  where  the
output quantity q can be sold at  price pl if the quantity is  less  than
the  specified  amount  q(l);  however,  quantities  in  excess  of  q(l)  can
only  be  sold  at  a  lower  price  p2,  The  revenue  function will  be
R(q)  =  pIq,  if q  = q(l);
=  p1q(1) +  p2 (q - q(l)),  if q >  q(l).
The profit maximization problem max {R(q)  - rx  q =  f(x)}  can  be rewritten
x,q
identically as  a model with  two perfectly  substitutable outputs:
max  pl  q  +  p 2q 2  - rx
qlq 2 ,x
subject to  ql  +  q  f(x),  0 <  q  < q(l),  q2 
>  0.
The quantity q(l)  is  a kink point  in  this model.
For  empirical  estimation,  either  the  direct  or  dual  approach  can  be
followed.  For dual  approach, application of Shephard's  lemma or the
Hotelling-McFadden  lemma provides  (notional) input  demand and output
supply  functions.  Stochastic elements  can be  introduced into  the
production  function  or  profit  or  cost  functions.  For  the  direct  approach,
1  2
el  E2
the  stochastic specification  F(q,  x;  c) =  G(q,  x) +  e  q +  e  x will be
similar to  the  stochastic specification  in section 3.  The marginal
productivity is  the  sum  of  a  deterministic  part  and  a  stochastic  part.
Under the  assumption that  the  disturbances are mutually independent,  a
computationally  tractable likelihood function  can similarly be derived.
In  the  following section, we apply our methods  to  the estimation of three
input  cost  functions where non-negativity constraints are binding for a
large proportion of  firms.16
5.  An  Application:  Estimation  of  an  Energy  Cost  Function
In this  section, we will apply the  econometric model  set  out above
to  the estimation of a translog energy cost  function.  The production
structure used in deriving energy demand relationships parallels that of
Fuss  (1977)  and  Pindyck  (1979).  First,  it  is  assumed  that  the  production
function  is weakly separable in energy inputs.  Thus the  cost-minimizing
mix  of  energy  inputs  is  independent  of  the  mix  of  other  factors.  Second,
the energy aggregate  is  assumed homothetic in its  components so that  cost
minimization becomes a two-stage procedure:  optimize the  mix of fuels
which  make  up  the energy-aggregate,  capital,  labor,  materials,  and  other
factors.  Here we will only estimate  the energy aggregator function from
which  interfuel substitution elasticities  can be derived.  The data used
in  the estimation come  from the raw data tapes of the annual industrial
surveys of Indonesia.  Two  cost functions  for two different sectors will
be  estimated  and  compared.  In  this  study,  three  fuels  are  identified:
(purchased) electricity, fuel  oils and other fuels.  All three  fuels went
unconsumed  by  a  substantial  number  of  firms  and  many  firms  consumed  only
one of the three.
The  (unobserved)  price  index  for  a  unit  of  energy  is  the  linearly  homogeneous
translog  cost  function,
3  1  3  3  3
£nP  a  =  a  +  E  a.np.  + _- I  Z  Z  . np  .np.  +  E.  E.np  (14) E  0  i=l  1  i  2  i=l  j= 1   j  1  j  i=1  (14)
where  the  disturbance  vector  e =  (e',  E•  ,  )'  is  assumed to be  distributed
N(0,  I).  The linearly homogeneous property in input prices yields parameter
3  3  3 restrictions  3i=1a i  +  i= i  =  1 and  1 j=.ij  =  0, for all i.  For normalization,
3  3
ia  =  1 and  i=  =  0.  Symmetry on the  B's implies  that  Bi.  ji  for
i=l  i  1  .j  ji
all i, j.  The notional cost shares for the inputs  from the Shephard's
lemma are17
s. =  a.  +  3' Znp +  c.  i=l,  2, 3  (15)
where  =  (Bil,  Ri2'  i3) and  tnp  =  (Znp1 ,  nP2, Znp  )'.  To derive  the
liklil  ihood  function for  tliis  model,  we need  to  dist iguishl  different
regimes.  For  three  goods  models,  there  are  seven  demand  regimes  in
total.  Broadly,  there  are  three  types  of  regimes;  namely,  all  three
inputs  are  used,  only  two  inputs  are  used,  or  only  one  kind  of  input  is
used.  For  the  likelihood  function  to  be  well  defined,  the  seven  regime
probabilities  need  to  sum  to  one - the model coherency requirement.
As  was  earlier  noted,  if  the  underlying  production  structure  satisfies  the
classical  properties,  the  model  will  be  coherent.  The  translog  cost
function, however, does not globally satisfy the  concavity property and
the  model may not be  coherent.  However, as pointed out  by  van Soest  and
Kooreman  (1986)  for  the  case  of  a  translog  indirect  utility  function,  the
derived  statistical  model  may  still  be  coherent  for  some  subset  of  the
parameter space.  This  is  also  true  in  our case.  Consider  the  regime
.1^
that  all  inputs  are  used with  observed  sample  s* where  s.  >  0  for  all
1
i=1,  2,  3.  This  regime  is  characterized  by  the  conditions:
a  +  'n  p  +  > 0,  a 2  +  'n  p  +  E2  >  0
'  a  +  a2  +  1  +  2 ) '  Zn p  + c  +  £2  <  1.  (16)
The  likelihood  function  for  this interior observation  is
f(sl  - a  - J,  tn  p,  s2  - 2  - B.  n p)
where  the  f is  the bivariate normal density function  for  (El' £2).  For
the second  type of  regime, s* =  (0,  s2,  s 3 ) where both  inputs s2  >  0
and s3  >  0.  The  logarithmic virtual price  for  good 1 at  s*  is18
ngl  =  -(al  +  812 £np 2  +  B1 3Ynp3  +  1) /  11
2
and  the  observed  second  share  equation  becomes
s*  = a^  +  a'np  + e  +  B(knE  - inpl s2  =  2  +  8np  + E2  21(Zn 1  - 1  np1
21
=  2  +  £np  +  e2   8  1  ( I a  +  Blnp  +  Ec)
11
*
The  regime  conditions  E  <  p  and  0  <  s  <  1  are  equivalent  to
1 (al +  8 £np +  el)  > 0,
11
21 1>  +  np  +  (  +  82 np  +  )n  +  >  0.  (17)
The  set  of  (e,'  C2)  values  which  satisfy  the  regime  conditions  (17)  will
not  overlap  with  the  (E,'  E2)  values  in  (16)  only  if  811  <  0.  With  81 1  <  0,
The  likelihood  function  for  s*  =  (0,  s2,  s 3 )  is
-( a
I  +  a81np)  -
/  f(e 1 ,  62 (s 2,  91))  dE:
-00
where  :2(s2,  l)  - s  a  np  +  2   (a2  +  1np  +  c)  This  likelihood
11
function  can  be  simplified  as  a  product  of  some  normal  density  function
and  normal  probability  function.  Consider  now  the  regime  with  s*  =
(0,  0,  1)  where  good  1  and  good  2  are  not  used.  The  virtual  prices  of
good  1  and  good  2  satisfy  the  relations
np  _  B11  12  1  +  8Rnp +
£np2   21  22 J  2  +  8  2 np + E2 b~n  21  1  r  '1
and  the  regime  conditions  are
12  [ 2 2 (a 1  +  1np +  El )  - 12  ( 2  +  2np  +  E2)  0
1122 - 12
1  2  [821( +  811np  +  El )  +  811(2  +  82£n  +  2) ]   0.  (l)
11l22-1219
The  (cl,  E2)  values  which  satisfy  the  inequalities  will  not  overlap  with
2
those  in  (16)  or  (17)  only  if  122  - 12  >  0.  The  likelihood  function
for  s*  =  (0,  0,1)  is
S12  (a2  +  B'np)  - (ao  +  Bznp)
J22
-- co
(1  (al  +  B'Anp)  - (a.  +  ,  np)
1  g(
1  '  *E  2 11  g~ c  g  (  e  9  )d  c  d e -co1  2 1  2
where  g  is  the  bivariate  normal  density  function  of  El  and  E2,  where
,  12  ,  21
1  =  E  2  E  and  c  - 2  +  E2.  The  likelihood  functions  for
1  1  3222  2  II  1  2
the  other  regimes  can  similarly  be  derived.  By  symmetric  arguments  for
2
each  pair  of  inputs,  the  constraints  g22  <  0,  g33  <  0,  Bll33  - B3  >  0  and
2
2233  - 23  >  0  are  also  necessary  for  model  coherency.  Denote
s.  =  a.  +  Bý'np  +  c.  for  i=l,  2,  3.  With  the  above  constraints  on  the
1  1
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Since  s  =  1  - sl  - s2,  all  the  conditions  can  also  be  expressed  in  terms
of  s 1  and  s2.  The  following  diagram  provides  a  representation  of  a




s  - --- s  =  1 11'
021
s  - 7-s  =  0
2  (^  1 11











s   - B-2  =  1 sl 2
12
s  - -22s  =  0










+  3  0.
3=
- _ __  .1
s2
..21
The data used in  the estimation come  from the  raw data tapes of  the
1978  annual  industrial  surveys  of  Indonesia  (Survey  Perusahaan  Industri).
Two  sectors  are  investigated  - fabricated  metal  products,  machinery  and
equipment  (ISIC classification  38)  and weaving and spinning  (ISIC classi-
fication 321).  All  three  fuels  were  nonconsumed  by  a  substantial  number
of  firms  in  both  sectors.
Not  all  of  Indonesia  is  electrified  and  thus  firms  which  are  located
in  areas  without  electricity  may  not  consume  it  because  of  a  binding  zero  ration
rather  than  a  negative  notional  demand.  The  problem  is  avoided  here  by
choosing  a  sample  of  firms  located  in  large  municipalities  (kotamadya),
all  of  which  are  electrified.  The  nonconsumption  of  electricity  in  these
cities  is  treated  as  the  result  of  firm  choice.
A problem in  interpreting the results  of  the energy cost  function
arises  from the transformation  of  purchased energy inputs  into other forms
of energy within the  firm.  For example, a firm which wishes to  drive
a  weaving  loom  (or  most  any  other  piece  of  mechanical  equipment)  can  do
so  in  any number of ways.  It  can attach an internal combustion engine  to
the  looms  driveshaft,  it  could  heat  a  boiler which  supplies  steam  to  a
turbine  which  in  turn drives  the  loom,  or  it  could  drive  the  loom  with
an  electric  motor  whose  electricity  is  either  purchased  or  obtained  by
using  fuels  to  drive  an  electric  generator.  All  of  these  methods  will
provide  the  force  required  to  drive  a  mechanical  loom  but  may  transform
purchased energy inputs  into  various other forms of energy along the way.
In  line with other investigators, we treat  the within-firm transformation
of energy  into other energy forms  - mechanical, electrical, heat,  pressure22
or otherwise  - as  part  of the production technology itself.  Thus,  energy
input  in  the  cost  function is  not the  force ultimately applied  directly
to  the  driveshaft  of a weaving loom, but  is  rather the  total  quantity of
energy  used  by  the  firm  to  achieve  the  work  of  the  loom.  In  Indonesia,
many  firms  transform  purchased  liquid  fuels  into  electrical  energy  within
their  plants.  Thus,  we  would  expect  fuel  oils  and  other  petroleum  fuels,
which are often used to  power electric generators  as well as  prime movers,
to  be  close  substitutes  for  purchased  electricity.
Firm  specific  characteristics,  as  well  as  randomness,  are  allowed  to
influence energy demands by making the  parameters a. in  (15)  linear 1
functions of  firm characteritics a. =  a' + Z.  y..z.  i=l,  2, 3.  The i  i  j  1j  j
characteristics z. include  the  share  of  the  firms equity owed  by  foreigners,
the  year  the  establishment  began  operation,  and the year squared.  Foreign
ownership  is  included  because  foreigners  may  be  less  flexible  in  altering
technologies and behaviors  in environments  that  differ from their home
country.  The  year  the  establishment  began  operation  is  included  in  recog-
nition of the  fact  that energy use patterns may be  somewhat  determined
by the  vintage of capital.  Any  such effect  is  unlikely to be  linear as
older  capital  equipment  is  replaced  with  newer  equipment.
Table  1 provides  the  sample  characteristics  for  the  data  used  in  the
estimation.  Table  2  provides  the maximum likelihood estimates of
the  parameters  of the  cost  function.  In estimating the parameters of  the
cost  functions, we impose the restrictions that  all the own-price parameters
Bii  are non-positive.  These  restrictions are necessary  (but not sufficient)
for the  coherency of  the model.  Note  that  for  the homothetic translog
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estimated  3..  in  both  cost  functions  are  indeed  negative
11
and not on  or near the  zero boundary.  We  confirmed the  coherency of both
of  our  estimated  cost  functions  in  a  manner  similar  to  Figure  2.  As
these  fuels  are expected to be  close  substitutes,  the negativity of the
ii..s  is  not  surprising.  However,  estimation  of  demands  among  goods
which  are  not  close  substitutes  may  result  in  the  incoherency  of  the
stochastic  model,  thus  limiting  the  usefulness  of  this  approach.  The
elasticities  of  Table  3 suggest  that  price  policies  which  rela-
tively  tax  or  subsidize  one  of  these  fuels  relative  to  the  others  will
have very large consequences on their relative demands.
Our  price  elasticities  are  slightly  larger  than  most  of  those
reported  in  the  literature.  Almost  all  the  existing  estimates  of  these
types  of energy price elasticities are  for the industrialized countries.
We  are not  aware of any other estimates of partial fuel  price elasticities
for  the manufacturing sector of another LDC.  Pindyck  (1979) has  esti-
mated partial fuel price  elasticities using a time  series of industrial
country cross-sections.  The  fuels  he  identified were electricity, oil,
gas  and coal.  Industrial partial  fuel  own-price elasticities were as
large  as  -.16  for  electricity, -1.1 for  oil,  -2.31  for gas  and -2.17
for coal.  Mount,  Chapman  and  Tyrrell  (1973)  have  estimated  electricity
elasticities  as  high  as  -1.20  for  the  U.S.  Halvorsen  (1976) has  reported
a partial price  elasticity for  oil of -2.75  for  U.S. industry.  Using a
panel  on  LDC  total  energy  demands,  Pindyck  found  fuel  oil elasticities
as  large  as  -2.89.  Thus,  our Indonesian estimates are not  out  of line
with  the largest  of  those  reported earlier.  We would expect  our elasticities
to be  larger than those  for industrialized countries.  Indonesian  firms
have  chosen  technologies that  do not  rely  as heavily on  industrialTable  3
Elasticities  and  Firm  Effects:
Weaving and  Spinning
Electricity  Fuel  Other
Price  -1.9561  1.0148  1.5406
elasticities
0.3946  -2.9188  0.9645
0.5615  0.9039  -3.5051
Firm effectsa
Foreign share  -1.225  1.081  2.208
Year started  10.77  -13.81  -14.83
Year squared  -10.65  17.82  10.20
Metal  Products
Electricity  Fuel  Other
Price  -3.5835  1.6596  2.1119
Elasticities
1.3647  -3.0426  0.5458
1.2188  0.3830  -3.6576
Firm effectsa
Foreign  share  -0.3581  0.2091  0.3225
Year started  6.736  -6.251  -2.765
Year squared  -10.98  10.54  4.005
a.  8£nx./3z 124
machinery  driven  by  purchased  electricity.  The  wide-spread  use  of  machinery
driven  by  prime  movers,  as  opposed  to  electric  motors,  and  the  installed
capJ;a  ity  to  prod•uce  e l, ct rici ty  in-plant,  make  petroleum  fuel  and  purchased
electricity  closer  substitutes  than  in  the  industrialized  countries.
Ihe asymptotic  t-values  presented  in  Table  2  suggest  that  foreign  owner-
ship  significantly  affects  the  shares  of  electricity  and  other  fuels  in  the
weaving  and  spinning  sectors  but  none  of  the  fuel  shares  in  the  metal  products
sector.  Vintage  effects  captured  by  the  "year  started"  variable  tend  to  have
greater  statistical  significance  in  the  metal  products  sector  than  in  weaving
and  spinning.  Table  3  provides  derivatives  of  input  quantities  with  respect
to  foreign  ownership,  "year  started"  and  its'  square.
6.  Summary  and  Conclusion
This  paper  extends  our earlier  work  (and  that  of  Wales  and  Woodland,  (1983))  on
estimating  consumer  demand  systems  with  binding  non-negativity  constraints  in
two  directions.  First,  we  generalize  our  methods  to  the  problem  of  estimating
demand  relationships  in  which  kink points occur  in  the  interior  (rather  than
the  vertices)  of  the  budget  set.  There  are  important  classes  of  problems
in  developing  countries  which  demonstrate  such  kinked  budget  sets.  This  gen-
eralization  differs  from  the  work  of  Hausman  (1985)  on  convex  budget  sets  in
that  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  are  directly  utilized  which  simplifies  the  analysis
in  certain  situations.  These  kink  points  are  caused  by  market  failure  and
incompleteness  often  resulting  from  the  direct  intervention  of  the  state  in
allocating  resources.
This  paper  also  extends  our  methods  on  binding  non-negativity  constraints
to  the  estimation  of  production  structures.  As  an  application  of  our  methods,
a  translog  cost  function  for  three  energy  inputs  is  estimated  from  cross-sections
of  individual  firms.  These  fuels  are  thought  close  substitutes  making  it  more
likely  that  coherency  conditions  are  fulfilled.  The  results  of  the  estimation
confirm  both  the  close  substitutability  of  fuel  inputs  and  the  coherency  of
the  model.25
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Footnotes
S  The  first  author  appreciates  having  financial  support  from  the  National
Science  Foundation  under grant  NSF/SES-8510473  to  the  University of Minne-
sota  for his research.  We appreciate  receiving  valuable  comments  from  an
anonymous  referee whose  suggestions  greatly improved our presentation.
1.  One  can, of  course, show that the conditions  in Hausman  (1979)  are
mathematically equivalent to  the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.  This  can be  done,
for example, by  applying the theorems  found in the  appendix of Lee  (1986).
2.  For  .ii.  0 it  is necessary that  cost shares respond to  own prices.